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The Ninth Circuit Expands the Mining 
Law’s Extralateral Rights Doctrine to 
Pegmatite Dikes 
MAHDI IBRAHIM*
JUDGE ROBERT C. COATES** 
What happens when a miner strikes gold (metaphorically and sometimes
literally speaking) under someone else’s land? As the Latin maxim states, 
“cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,” which translates to
“whoever owns [the] soil, [it] is theirs all the way [up] to Heaven and [down]
to Hell.”1 It would seem the answer to who has a right to minerals below 
their property would be straight forward based on this Latin maxim. 
However, this is not truly the case. Over the last century, courts have 
expanded the idea of “extralateral rights” and allowed an adjacent landowner 
to claim a right to the minerals underneath someone else’s land, even if 
the minerals were outside of the mining landowner’s property lines. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and culminating with Swoboda v. 
Pala Mining Co. 844 F.2d 654 (1988), courts (in particular the Ninth 
Circuit in this case) have slowly chipped away at the idea that a landowner 
has a rightful claim to everything located below his land. 
* © 2020 Mahdi Ibrahim.  Associate Attorney, Bagula, Riviere, Coates and Associates, 
LLP.  J.D. 2010, University of San Diego School of Law; B.S. 2006, Penn State University. 
** © 2020 Judge Robert C. Coates. Partner, Bagula, Riviere, Coates and Associates, 
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1. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126, 128 (1966); Samantha J. 
Hepburn, Ownership Models for Geological Sequestration: A Comparison of the Emergent 
Regulatory Models in Australia & the United States, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
10310, 10313 (2014). 
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In the period immediately following its formation, the United States
population boomed, increasing over 30% year after year from 1790 to
1870. The population increased ten-fold from approximately 3,929,214
in 1790 to a whopping 38,558,371 in 1870.2 Following a deadly and costly 
Civil War, the United States now had the opportunity to turn its attention 
to recovering economically. After the Civil War, intent on opening up the 
Western lands for economic development, Congress enacted a series of 
laws, starting with the Homestead Act and ending with the Mining Law 
of 1872.3 A central feature of the Mining Law was the Extralateral Rights
Doctrine, which codified the practices of the miners in Virginia City (as 
4described by Mark Twain in Roughing It ) and California. Under the 
Extralateral Rights Doctrine, a miner with a valid claim could pursue a 
vein of ore underground wherever the vein led even across the projections 
of property lines. This doctrine was applied to a pegmatite structure, which is 
not a vein, for the first time in 1988 in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
case of Swoboda v. Pala Mining Co. 844 F.2d 654 (1988); and the Court 
found that the pegmatite structure, in its entirety, was analogous to a vein 
of ore.5 The Court ignored the fact that when the miner in question
penetrated across the projection of the property line he was not digging 
into ore. The United States Geology Survey defines “ore” as naturally 
occurring material from which a mineral or minerals of economic value 
can be extracted.6 However, in Swoboda, at that initial stage of penetration 
the miner went through pure feldspar, which could not be sold at a profit7 
(feldspar is the name given to a group of minerals distinguished by the
presence of alumina and silica in their chemistry and make up about 60% of
all exposed rock8). But about 25 feet across the boundary line, the miner 
penetrated a huge cavern full of highly profitable tourmaline gemstones. 
The Mining Law of 1872 codified practices of western mining men and 
included an artifact from German and Austrian law from centuries past: 
2. United States Census Bureau, CENSUS90, United States: 1790-1990, https://www.
census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8V8-ADYK] (last revised 
Feb. 24, 2020). 
3. 30 U.S.C.S. § 26 (LexisNexis 1872). The Mining Law was made to promote 
the development of the mining resources of the United States. 
4. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 196 (Am. Pub. Co., 1872). Roughing It is a semi-
autobiographical travel literature which recounts Twain’s travel west with Orion Clemens, 
his brother and Secretary of the Nevada territory. 
5.  Swoboda v. Pala Mining Co., 844 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1988).
6.  U.S. Geological Surv., EarthWord-Ore, U.S.G.S. (Feb. 15, 2016). 
7.  Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 655. 
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the so-called Extralateral Rights Doctrine.9 The Extralateral Rights Doctrine
dates back to at least 1249 and became confirmed as the law of the land 
by various proclamations and charters of kings and rulers of the region 
over the years.10 Under this doctrine, a mining claimant was permitted to
follow a “vein of ore” wherever it might lead, underground, even though 
this might occasion crossing the downward projections of surface property 
lines.11 Before Swoboda, the doctrine had not been applied to pegmatite
structures. The Extralateral Rights Doctrine, codified in 30 U.S.C. § 26, 
provides claim owners with the exclusive right and possession of all “veins, 
lodges and ledges, throughout their entire depth” and legally permits owners 
to encroach upon another’s property boundaries under certain circumstances, 
12 as was the case here.
A pegmatite structure is an interesting geological phenomenon representing 
hot, liquid quartz and feldspar (mainly), which had been “squirted” upwards
into the surrounding “country rock,” and then slowly cooled off. Typically, 
this cooling resulted in an outer zone of mainly feldspar (with quartz, primary 
constituent of granite) and an inner core of quartz . . . and if one is fortunate, 
an innermost core of lithia (lithium oxide) and lepidolites with pockets 
containing gemstones (in the case in question, tourmalines).13 Lepidolites
are the most abundant lithium-bearing mineral found in the world.14 Lithium 
minerals were used directly as ore concentrates in ceramics and glass 
applications. More recently, with the increase in portable electronic devices, 
lithium is overwhelmingly used in rechargeable battery technology.15 
During World War II, there was an increase in Lithium mining, reaching 
a peak production of 84,800 units of lithia in 1944.16 Nowadays, lithium
 9. Wm. E. Colby, The Extralateral Right: Shall It Be Abolished?, 4 CAL. L. REV. 361, 
363 (1916), doi:10.2307/3474397, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3474397?seq=2#metadata 
_info_tab_contents [https://perma.cc/338F-9FGX].
10. Id. at 363–64. 
11.  30 U.S.C. § 26. 
12. Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 656; see also 30 U.S.C. § 26.
13. Agnes Diggs, Tour of Stewart Mine reveals hidden treasures, S.D. UNION TRIB. 
(Apr. 17, 2005), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tour-of-stewart-mine-reveals-
hidden-treasures-2005apr17-story.html [https://perma.cc/DRK6-M79F]. 
14. W.A. DEER, ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROCK FORMING MINERALS 218
(Longman, 3rd ed. 1966). 
15. U.S. Geological Surv., EarthWord-Ore, U.S.G.S. (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.
usgs.gov/news/earthword-%E2%80%93-ore [https://perma.cc/PQ3G-VDUV]. 
16. James J. Norton & Dorothy McKenney Schlegel, Lithium resources of North 
America, USGS 325, 330 (1955), https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/b1027G [https://perma.
cc/GJJ3-H2Y4]. 
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is considered one of thirty-five “critical” minerals by the United States
government.17 In Swoboda, the Court considered a doctrine dating back to
the nineteenth century, and contemporaneously analyzed and adopted 
nineteenth century legal precedent to determine the rights of the parties to 
precious stones uncovered from the subsurface of real property.18 Importantly, 
the court applied the Extralateral Rights Doctrine to a pegmatite dike 
structure and granted the appellee, Edward Swoboda, the rights to the 
structure extending upon the subsurface of the Pala Indian Reservation 
property. The Court in Swoboda disposed of the Pala Indians’ claims and 
applied case law to demonstrate that the pegmatite is analogous to a vein 
and should be protected by the Extralateral Rights Doctrine.19 
The facts in Swoboda state that the pegmatite was one of the world’s 
largest, nearly 150 feet thick, dipping some 35 degrees to the west and
projecting from the plaintiff’s mining claim (for lithia—a deposit so rich 
that in 1820 this one mine supplied 70 percent of America’s Lithia). The 
Appellee, Edward Swoboda, had owned and operated the Stewart Mine 
(“the Mine”) since 1980.20 The Mine was comprised of 19.54 acres directly 
adjacent to and bordering the Pala Indian Reservation (“Appellants”) in 
San Diego County.21 Within the boundaries of the Mine owned by Swoboda 
(and his predecessors in interest), is the apex of a pegmatite dike.22 
The Mine was originally located in 1898 and until the mid-1920’s, the 
claim was worked principally to mine lepidolite. On April 26, 1949, the 
Department of the Interior granted Swoboda’s predecessor-in-interest a 
mineral patent to the Stewart Mine.23 Swoboda and his predecessors-in-
interest tunneled below the surface of the Pala Indian Reservation, which 
was located directly adjacent to the Mine.24 In October 1980, Pala Mining
Inc. (“PMI”) then extracted earth from the surface of their property, which 
ran directly over Swoboda’s tunnel network. Swoboda then sought to prevent 
further excavation by filing a complaint for damages and injunctive relief. 
Swoboda provided a moral justification for bringing a suit against PMI 
while excavating minerals below the Pala land and alleged that “PMI’s 
17. See supra note 11. 
18. Mining rights were such a popular topic at the time that even future president 
Herbert Hoover (a mining engineer) and his wife Lou Henry Hoover (a geologist) wrote 
an English translation of De re metallica, a book cataloging the state of the art of mining, 
refining, and smelting metals, published originally in 1556. De re metallica, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_re_metallica [https://perma.cc/Z4VA-TZFG]. 
19. Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 657. 
20. Swoboda originally acquired the mine in 1968 and reacquired it in 1980. See 
Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 655 n.1. 
 21. Id. 
22. Id. at 656. 
23. Id. at 655. 
24. Id. 
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activities endangered the lives and safety of any miners or other persons 
present in the tunnel network.”25 
The United States District Court appointed a Special Master pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Upon examination of the contested
issues and the evidence presented by all parties the Special Master found
that the pegmatite dike constituted a vein within the meaning of 30 
U.S.C.S. 26. The Special Master assessed $35,000 in actual damages and
$140,000 in punitive damages against the Pala. Pala objected to these 
findings and filed for its notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.26 
The Swoboda Court relied on nineteenth century cases to determine
whether the Pala had any rights to the mineral located under their own
land. The Ninth Circuit relied on the 1898 United States Supreme Court 
decision in Del Monte Mining and Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining and 
Milling Co. 171 U.S. 55 (1898).27 In Del Monte, appellee, Last Chance,
held a mining claim on land in which a vein of silver was located. A 
portion of that silver vein extended below the surface of appellant Del 
Monte’s land. Being that the portion of the silver vein below Del Monte’s 
land could be worth a lot of money, a dispute arose between the parties 
(as expected). In the Court’s analysis in Del Monte, the United States 
Supreme Court determined that, according to U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2322 (now 
codified in 30 U.S.C. § 26), 
[T]he top or apex of [a pegmatite dike] which lies inside of such surface lines 
extended downward vertically becomes his by virtue of his location, and he
may pursue it to any depth beyond his vertical sidelines, although in so doing he 
enters beneath the surface of other proprietor.28 
The legal ability to intrude upon subsurface vertical property lines hinges 
on whether a vein or lode begins on a claim and extends to another. The 
Court determined that as long as the apex of the lode or vein was within 
the miner’s surface lines, the miner had the right to pursue the lode or vein
throughout its entirety, even if it crossed under another’s property line.29 
The Court believed that if it were to take away the right for a miner to
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 656. 
27. Id. at 656 (citing Del Monte Mining and Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining and
Milling Co. 171 U.S. 55 (1898)). 
28. Del Monte Mining and Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171
U.S. 55, 89 (1898). 
29. Id. 
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follow the lode or vein of an apex within the miner’s surface lines, the 
Court would be taking away all that is of value to the miner.30 
Now that the Court allowed a miner to pursue a vein or lode below the 
surface of another’s land, what was considered a “lode or vein”? A precise
definition of lode or vein has eluded judicial consistency for years and
caused the issue of extralateral rights even more ambiguity. As stated by
the United States Supreme Court, “[w]hat constitutes lode or vein of mineral 
matter has been no easy thing to define. In this court no clear definition 
has been given.”31 
In trying to give a clearer picture to what constitutes a lode or vein, the 
Ninth Circuit in Swoboda looked at ancient case law (which relied on even 
older case law). The Iron Silver Court looked to another jurisdiction in
which mining was booming at the time, Nevada, to help give more a precise 
definition of a “lode or vein.” In an 1877 case, Justice Stephen J. Field
(Circuit Court of Appeals of Nevada) attempted to give a definition of a 
lode or vein, stating: 
It is difficult to give any definition of the term as understood and used in the acts
of Congress, which will not be subject to criticism. A fissure in the earth’s crust, 
an opening in its rocks and strata made by some force of nature, in which the
mineral is deposited, would seem to be essential to a lode in the judgment of 
geologists. But, to the practical miner, the fissure and its walls are only of importance
as indicating the boundaries within which he may look for and reasonably expect 
to find the ore he seeks. A continuous body of mineralized rock lying within any 
other well-defined boundaries on the earth’s surface and under it, would equally 
constitute, in his eyes, a lode. We are of opinion, therefore, that the term as used
in the acts of Congress is applicable to any zone or belt of mineralized rock lying
within boundaries clearly separating it from the neighboring rock.32 
Further, the Ninth Circuit in Swoboda relied on another nineteenth century
court case to define what constituted a lode or vein; the Colorado circuit
court case Stevens v. Williams, 23 F. Cas. 40 (1879). In Stevens, the Court 
gives a lode or vein a broad definition by stating, 
“[i]n short, if there is a general and pervading continuance of this mineral matter
with a casual and occasional interruption, but pursuing the same general course, 
bounded by the same rocky material above and below as far as you can trace that 
until it breaks off totally and is interrupted for a very large distance, it is a vein
of rock or matter.”33 
Therefore, according to Stevens, a vein or lode could be non-continuous,
interrupted, and “so narrow that only a sheet of paper could be got into”
30. Id. at 91.
31. Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U.S. 529, 533 (1886).
32. Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co., 8 F. Cas. 819, 823 (1877)
(emphasis added).
33. Stevens v. Williams, 23 F. Cas. 40, 42 (1879).
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and still be considered a lode or vein for the purpose of gaining mining 
rights.34 The “very large distance” that the Stevens court mentions to cut
off ownership rights is never given a precise definition and is left vague 
for future courts (and law review articles) to debate. However, judges in 
the ancient court cases usually ruled in favor of the miner discovering the 
apex and seemingly strained to allow said miner to obtain the benefits of 
having discovered the apex in the first place. 
Relying on the Del Monte decision, and the proposition that “the top or
apex of [a pegmatite dike] which lies inside of such surface lines extended 
downward vertically” becomes his by virtue of his location, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Swoboda had exclusive possession of the pegmatite 
dike below the Pala land, but only if it could be determined that the
pegmatite dike constituted a “vein or lode.”35 However, again, the parties
in Swoboda stipulated to facts which would render the instant argument 
irrelevant. The parties stipulated that although a body of commercially 
viable mineral was not continuous, mineral-bearing rock was continuous.36 
Pursuant to the Iron Silver and Eureka definitions employed by the Court, 
the continuity of mineral-bearing rocks was all that was necessary to find 
a vein, permitting Swoboda to extract the minerals reaching across his
surface property boundaries.37 
In Swoboda, the parties stipulated that there existed well-defined 
boundaries to the pegmatite structure, which led the court to acknowledge 
that a lode or vein existed in accordance with the definition as set forth in 
Iron Silver. Next, the Pala asserted that the lack of continuity of an 
“unbroken body of commercially viable minerals” defeated the claim
that the structure in question met the definition of a lode or vein. However, 
following the very (very) broad definition of what constitutes a vein or 
lode in the Stevens case, and the vagueness of “interrupted for a very large 
distance,” Swoboda (more likely the Court itself) easily defeated Pala’s
argument that the vein or lode was an unbroken body of viable minerals. 
Ultimately, the Court found that appellant Swoboda held possession to 
extralateral rights permitting intrusion within the boundary lines of the 
appellee’s claim by finding that the dike was a “vein of mineral matter” 
as defined by previous nineteenth century United States case law.38 Additionally, 
34. Id. 
35.  Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 654. 
36. Id. at 654. 
37. Id. at 657. 
38. Id. 
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the question of whether a continuity of an unbroken body of rock containing
commercially valuable minerals was considered in the Court’s determination
and ultimately found to be sufficient in lieu of a continuous unbroken 
body of viable minerals.39 
Following the logic from Swoboda, the Ninth Circuit seems to grant very 
wide latitude for a miner to pursue a pegmatite dike that extends beyond 
their boundaries (at least when adjudicating claims against Indian land
rights). By relying on nineteenth century case law, the Swoboda Court 
allowed a miner to pursue a dike into the land of another. The criteria to
do so are almost as vague today as they were in the nineteenth century
since based on the case law, a miner can pursue a pegmatite dike: whether 
or not the vein or lode is continuous,40  whether it contains commercially 
viable materials or not,41  and whether the vein or lode is as thick as an elephant 
or as thin as sheet of paper.42 
Finally, in addition to the expansive definitions that the Ninth Circuit 
applied in Swoboda that allowed Swoboda the rights to the pegmatite dike 
below the Pala Indian land, the Ninth Circuit added insult to injury by
ruling, “Swoboda’s predecessors-in-interest located the Stewart Mine in 
1898; the Pala Indians did not receive the patent for the reservation land
until 1920.”43 Therefore, “the trust patent for the Pala Indian Reservation 
does not preclude ownership by Swoboda of extralateral rights in the 
pegmatite dike vein within the surface of the reservation.”44 
Following Swoboda, the Latin maxim “cuius est solum, eius est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos,” will have to be updated to reflect the current 
reality—“whoever owns [the] soil, [it] is theirs all the way [up] to Heaven
and [down] to Hell”. . . sometimes. 
39. Id. 
40.  Stevens v. Williams, 23 F. Cas. 40, 43 (1879). 
41.  Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co., 8 F. Cas. 819, 822 (1877). 
42. Stevens, 23 F. Cas. at 43. 
43. Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 658; see James J. Norton and Dorothy McKenney Schlegel, 
Lithium Resources of North America, GEOLOGICAL SURV. BULL. 1027-G (Dep’t of Interior 
1955) (“Production of lithium increased during World War I and reached 11,696 tons in 
1920.”). 
44. Swoboda, 844 F.2d at 658. 
122
